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IN THE SHADOW OF DANIEL WEBSTER: ARGUING
APPEALS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

Seth P. Waxman*
It is natural-I suppose it is expected-for every Solicitor
General to hold forth at some point during his tenure with pearls
of wisdom on the Twelve Secrets, or Ten Commandments, or
Five Essential Rules of effective oral advocacy. I have always
been reluctant to do that. Sixty years ago, John W. Davis, a
storied Solicitor General and a brilliant appellate star, observed
that any lecture on the argument of an appeal should come from
a judge, rather than from an advocate. As he explained,
Supposing fishes had the gift of speech. Who would listen
to a fisherman's weary discourse on flycasting, the shape
and color of the fly, the size of the tackle, the length of the
line, the merit of different rod makers, and all the other
tiresome stuff that fishermen talk about, if the fish himself
could be induced to give his views on the most effective
methods of approach. For after all, it is the fish that the
angler is after and all his recondite learning is but the
I
hopeful means to that end.
The Solicitor General may be, in the vernacular, the so2
called Tenth Justice. But make no mistake: just like Davis, he is
a fisherman, not a fish. So let me hasten to finish Davis's point:
[I]t is true, is it not, that in the argument of an appeal the
advocate is angling, consciously and deliberately angling,
for the judicial mind. Whatever tends to attract judicial
*Partner, Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering; Solicitor General of the United States (\997-2001).
This essay is based on a keynote address delivered at the Twelfth Annual Judges Appellate
Practice Institute on June 2, 2000, and so is a government work in which no copyright may
be claimed. The author gratefully acknowledges the a~sistance of Robyn L. Thiemann.
\. John W. Davis, The Argument of an Appeal, 26 ABA J. 895 (Dec. 1940). (The
Davis essay is reprinted in this issue at page 745.)
2. Lincoln Caplan, The Tenth Justice: The Solicitor General and the Rule of Law 3
(Alfred A. Knopf 1987).
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favor to the advocate's claim is useful. Whatever repels it is
useless or worse. The whole art of the advocate consists in
choosing the one and avoiding the other. Why otherwise
have argument at all?3
Davis offered his self-effacing remarks at the introduction
of a speech in' which he proceeded to offer ten rules-a
Decalogue-of effective oral advocacy.4 And so, reluctantly,
after years of resistance, I too will unburden myself of a few
principles. First, though, I would like to reach back in history for
some inspiration by reflecting a bit on Daniel Webster.
WEBSTER THE ADVOCATE

Born in 1782, Daniel Webster lived the fullest of lives
5
throughout his 70 years. A Congressman, a Senator, and a
Secretary of State, he was a towering force in American politics
and law. So deep was the mark he left that Webster's influence
during the first half of the nineteenth century is hard to
overstate. In Stephen Vincent Benet's marvelous classic, The
Devil and Daniel Webster, the author described him as
the biggest man in the country. He never got to be
President, but he was the biggest man. There were
thousands that trusted in him right next to G-d Almighty,
and they told stories about him ... that were like the stories
of the patriarchs and such. They said, when he stood up to
speak, stars and stripes came right out of the sky .... They
said, when he walked the woods with his fishing rod ... the
trout would jump out of the streams right into his pockets,
for they knew it was no use putting up a fight against him;

3. Davis, supra n. I, at 895.
4. Id. at 896-99. Davis's well-regarded speech became the touchstone of an equally
well-known and well-regarded lecture delivered a decade later by Justice (and previously
Solicitor General) Jackson. See Robert H. Jackson, Advocacy Before the Supreme Court:
Suggestions for Effective Case Presentations, 37 ABA J. 801 (Nov. 1951). Many other
articles offer similar lists of rules and similar advice on oral advocacy. See e.g. Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, Remarks 011 Appellate Advocacy, 50 S.c. L. Rev. 567 (1999); Henry D. Gabriel,
Preparatioll alld Delivery of Oral Argumellt ill Appellate Courts, 22 Am. J. Tr. Advoc. 571
(1999); Paul R. Michel, Effective Appellate Advocacy, 24 Litig. 19 (Summer 1998); Rex E.
Lee, Oral Argument ill the Supreme Court, 72 ABA 1. 60 (July 1986).
5. Two good sources of biographical information on Webster are Robert V. Remini,
Daniel Webster: The Man alld His Time (W. W. Norton & Co. 1997) and George Ticknor
Curtis, Life of Dalliel Webster (2d ed., D. Appleton & Co. 1870).
.
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and, when he argued a case, he could tum on the harps of
the blessed and the shaking of the earth underground. That
6
was the kind of man he was.
I mention Daniel Webster not because of his mastery of
American politics, but rather because he is widely regarded as
the greatest advocate ever to argue in an American court.
McCulloch v. Maryland,7 Gibbons v. Ogden,8 Luther v. Borden, 9
11
the Charles River Bridge CaselO-Webster argued them all.
Webster's qualities and accomplishments as an advocate have
been extolled so often that the highest praise to which any
modem lawyer can aspire is to be deemed "almost as good as
Daniel Webster." In the realm of advocacy, Webster doesn't
merely sit in the Pantheon: He is Zeus himself. 12
Just how good was Webster, and what made him so fine an
advocate? We are too late to see his gifts in action, but we can
glimpse the qualities that contributed to his mastery by studying
contemporary accounts of his oral arguments. One example is
the argument he made in the celebrated Dartmouth College
13
case. Webster represented the college's trustees, who opposed
state legislation revising the college's original charter. 14
Opposing him was another great advocate-William Wirt-who
was then Attorney General of the United States, but who argued
in this case as private counsel for the State of New Hampshire. 15
6. Stephen Vincent Benet, The Devil and Daniel Webster 14-15 (Holt, Rinehart &
Winston 1937).
7. 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
8. 22 U.S. I (1824).
9. 48 U.S. I (1849).
10. 36 U.S. 420 (183 7 ).
II. Maurice G. Baxter, Daniel Webster and the Supreme Court 58-64, 119-35, 170-78,
196-207 (U. Mass. Press 1966).
12. It was not always thus. As a young man at Exeter, Webster found himself incapable
of public speaking. He recalled in later life that despite extensive rehearsal, he could as a
schoolboy never "command sufficient resolution" to perform, and that he often "wept
bitter tears of mortification" after his failures. See Daniel Webster, Autobiography, in The
Private Correspondence of Daniel Webster, vol. I, 9-10 (Fletcher Webster ed., Little,
Brown & Co. 1857).
'.
13. Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518 (1819).
14. /d. at 551-52.
15. See Remini, supra n. 5, at 153. Several authors have noted that Wirt was far too
overworked to give the Dartmouth College case the attention it deserved. Jd.; Baxter, supra
n. II at 79. Arguments began on March 10, 1818, see Remini, supra n. 5, at 154, and Wirt
had argued nine cases between February 3 and February 16, id. at 153 n. 72.
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Webster faced a challenge, and perhaps the best account of
his rising to meet it is that of Justice Joseph Story-in John W.
Davis's vernacular, a "fish." Story took note of the "decorous
deference" with which Webster began his presentation, and the
"lucid order and elegant arrangement, by which each
progressive position sustained and illustrated every other." 16
Webster began, Story recalled, "by unfolding the facts in that
brief but exact manner for which he is so remarkable."
Thereafter, "arriving at the points for which he meant to
contend, he first presented them in their general bearing and
aspect" and then proceeded "to the more minute analysis,"
bringing out "into singular felicity and clearness all the various
learning, from juridical authorities, from historical archives,
from parliamentary debates, from elementary writers, which
could illustrate and fortify his grounds." 17
Story maintained that no written summary of Webster's
argument could convey "the form and impress, the manner and
expression, glowing zeal, the brilliant terms of diction, the
spontaneous bursts of rebuke... , the sparkling eye, the
quivering lip, the speaking gesture, the ever changing, and ever
moving tones of the voice, which add such strength and pathos,
and captivating enchantment to the orator as his words flow
rapidly on during actual delivery." 18 As Webster continued, he
kindled into more energetic action, and ... scintillated at
every step .... At times his voice rose almost into startling
impetuosity. It was the struggle of the giant to relieve the
incumbent pressure of his thoughts, to deliver over the
strong workings of his soul, and to uproot the very
foundations of the opposing argument .... It was a relief
even to gain in his momentary pauses some short interval
of repose from the intense stretch of thought, by which the
mind was irresistibly driven." 19

Obviously impressed, Story goes on and on. But this is how
he concludes his account:

16. Everett Pepperell Wheeler, Daniel Webster: The Expounder of the Constitution 29
(G.P. Putnam's Sons 1905) (reprinting excerpts from unsigned, undated documents in
Joseph Story's handwriting contained in the Webster Papers, Library of Congress).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 29-30.
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There was a painful anxiety towards the close. The whole
audience had been wrought up to the highest excitement;
many were dissolved in tears; many betrayed the most
agitating mental struggles; many were sinking under
exhausting efforts to conceal their own emotion. When Mr.
Webster ceased to speak, it was some minutes before
anyone seemed inclined to break the silence. The whole
seemed but an agonizing dream, from which the audience
20
was slowly and almost unconsciously awakening.
Those of us who labor at Webster's craft today can only
dream that an account like that could ever be made of one of our
own efforts. But Story's appreciation raises in my mind a
fundamental question: Was it reason or rhetoric that made
Webster's advocacy so memorable? Webster himself always
emphasized the former and downplayed the latter. In fact, when
he published the transcript of his argument in the Dartmouth
College case, he excised most of what he called "peroration"
21
because it embarrassed him. Chauncey Goodrich, who attended
the argument, asserted that it was "pure reason" rather than
eloquence that marked Webster's speech, finding in it "a tone of
earnest conversation which ran throughout the great body of the
speech.,,22 And yet consider Goodrich's quotation of Webster's
concluding remarks:

20. Id. at 30-31. One may question whether Story was a completely neutral observer.
Webster and Story shared a close friendship and spent much time together. See Baxter.
supra n. II, at 21-23; Gerald T. Dunne, Justice Joseph Story and the Rise o/the Supreme
Court 179 (Simon & Schuster 1970) (observing that "the association of Congressman
Daniel Webster and Mr. Justice Story, which had been in effect since 1813 on matters
ranging from federal judicial jurisdiction to bankruptcy... amounted almost to a
partnership"). And while each man was always quick to praise the other, Story once went
so far as to write an anonymous article in the New England Magazine exalting and
defending Webster. See Baxter, supra, n. II at 21-22; see also R. Kent Newmyer, Supreme
Court Justice Joseph Story: Statesman o/the Old Republic 177 (U. N.C. Press 1985).
21. In a letter to Jeremiah Mason, who had represented the trustees in the Superior
Court, see Remini, supra n. 5, at 151, Webster wrote,
Since I came home, a young man in my office has assisted me to copy my
minutes, and I have been foolish enough to print three or four copies .... They
are hastily written off, with much abbreviation, and contain little else than
quotation from the cases. All the nonsense is left out .... These precautions
were taken to avoid the indecorum of publishing the creature.
Letter from Daniel Webster to Jeremiah Mason (Apr. 23, 1818), in Webster, supra n. 12, at
281.
22. Curtis, supra n. 5, at 170 (reprinting reminiscence of Goodrich).
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Sir, you may destroy this little institution; it is weak, it is in
your hands! I know it is one of the lesser lights in the
literary horizon of our country. You may put it out! But if
you do, you must carry through your work! You must
extinguish, one after another, all these great lights of
science which for more than a century have thrown their
radiance over our land! It is, Sir, as I have said, a small
college. And yet there are those who love it!23
That, fellow anglers, is not reason alone. It is a sublime
union of reason and rhetoric.
WEBSTER THE EXAMPLE

Reading about Webster brings to mind the sad truth that, as
Mark Twain put it, "few things are harder to put up with than
the annoyance of a good example." 24 Inspiring though it is to
recall Webster's towering achievements, we might as well admit
that we could never equal them. That is true not only because
few mortals can claim the blessing of Webster's gifts. It is also
true because no advocate today will ever have the opportunity to
perform in the arena Webster commanded. The days of oral
advocacy as declamation, of unlimited time and no page limits,
are over. Can anyone now imagine the luxury of an oral
argument stretching for hours, or even for days, without
interruption by questions? For Webster, though, that was
routine: the Dartmouth College argument spanned three days,25
26
and that in McCullough v. Maryland, four. Appellate argument
is so different today that one commentator has observed that
" [t]he modem practitioner bears the same relationship to Daniel
Webster as an airline pilot bears to Ponce de Leon." 27
Yet, although "the romance is largely gone, the speed has
increased incomprehensibly, [and] the margin for error has
narrowed to approximately zero," we, like the lawyers of
28
Webster's day, find ourselves on our own at oral argument.
23. Id.
24. Mark Twain, The Tragedy of Pudd'nhead Wilson 120 (Harper & Row 1966).
25. Remini, supra n. 5, at 154-59.
26. Id. at 164.
27. Steven D. Merryday, Oral Argument, Fla. App. Prac. Handbook §17.9, at 16-17
(1998).
28. Id.
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And while we no longer live in a world that otherwise much
resembles Webster's, the principles evident in the Master's work
apply with equal force today.
Passion

This first principle is the most fundamental. If you want to
be a great oral advocate, you must care passionately about your
work. Justice Story recalled Webster's "earnestness of manner,
and a depth of research, and a potency of phrase, which at once
convinced you that his whole soul was in the cause."29 That
wasn't theater; Webster did put his whole soul into the cause he
was arguing. You need only read Webster's published letters to
understand that he saw complete dedication as the key to his
work-dedication to his client, to his craft, and to the principles
30
to which he believed his profession should aspire. As Chief
Justice Fuller once observed, "It is impossible to overestimate
the support the Court derives from the bar, and in Mr. Webster's
arguments fidelity to the Court is as conspicuous as fidelity to
his client. It is not the client first and the conscience afterwards,
but duty to both together, one and inseparable.,,31
That passionate devotion to duty has continued to resonate
with judges and lawyers from generation to generation. Fifty
years ago, Justice Robert Jackson, another great Solicitor
General, wrote his own article about oral advocacy, 32 closing
with a parable about stone masons who might have been
lawyers. In Justice Jackson's story, the first mason, asked what
he was doing, answered, "Earning my living"; the second
replied, "I am shaping this stone to pattern"; but the third lifted

29. See Wheeler, supra n. 16, at 30.
30. See e.g. letter from Daniel Webster to James fl. Bingham (May 18, 1802) in
Webster, supra n. 12, at III (" If I prosecute the profession, I pray God to fortify me
against its temptations. To the winds I dismiss those light hopes of eminence which
ambition inspired and vanity fostered. To be 'honest, to be capable, to be faithful' to my
client and my conscience, I earnestly hope will be my first endeavor."); letter from Daniel
Webster to James H. Bingham (Jan. 19, 1806) in id. at 222 (" Our profession is good if
practiced in the spirit of it; it is damnable fraud and iniquity, when its true spirit is supplied
by a spirit of mischief-making and money-catching.").
31. Wheeler, supra n. 16, at 3 n. I (quoting Chief Justice Fuller's remarks at the
Webster Centennial).
32. Jackson, supra n. 4, at 801.
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his eyes and said, "I am building a Cathedral." 33 And so it is,
said Justice Jackson,
with the men of the law at labor before the Court. The
attitude and preparation of some show that they have no
conception of their effort higher than to make a living.
Others are dutiful but uninspired in trying to shape their
little cases to a winning pattern. But it lifts up the heart of a
judge when an advocate stands at the bar who knows that
34
he is building a Cathedral.

Preparation

The second principle that Webster's work exemplifies
builds on the first. Webster acknowledged, as we all know we
should, the absolute importance of comprehensive preparation.
Lawyers who are merely earning a living or shaping stones will
prepare enough to get by, and if they are lucky they will perform
well. But lawyers like Daniel Webster, who know they are
building cathedrals, will prepare for each argument as if
constructing a monument. Things may not-indeed, they will
not-always tum out precisely as we hope, but for lawyers like
Webster, it will not be for lack of effort. For lawyers building a
cathedral, every argument demands what others might deride as
over-preparation. "Accuracy and diligence," Webster said, "are
much more necessary to a lawyer than great comprehension of
mind, or brilliancy of talent." 35 To be a great lawyer, he
recognized, one" must first consent to be only a great drudge." 36
The night before his grand performance in Gibbons v. Ogden,
Webster worked for eleven straight hours, pausing only to

33. [d. at 864.
34. /d.

35. Letter from Daniel Webster to Thomas Merrill (Nov. II, 1803), in The Writings
and Speeches of Daniel Webster, vol. 17, 148-49 (Fletcher Webster ed. 1903).
36. [d.; see also letter from Daniel Webster to James H. Bingham (Jan. 19, 1806) in
Webster, supra n. 12, at 222 (" Study is truly the grand requisite for a lawyer. Men may be
born poets, and leap from their cradles painters; nature. may have made them musicians,
and called upon them only to exercise, and not to acquire, ability. But law is artificial. It is
a human science to be learnt, not inspired. Let there be a genius for whom nature has done
so much as apparently to have left nothing for application, yet to make a lawyer,
application must do as much as if nature had done nothing.").
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shave, eat, and read the morning paper before appearing at the
Court. 37
As Webster understood, the goal of preparation is simply
this: When you walk into the courtroom to make your oral
argument, you should know every aspect of the case better than
anyone else does. Certainly you should know it far better than
any judge. You must know the entire factual record. You must
comfortably understand all of the relevant law, whatever its
source. And finally you must do something else that is far more
difficult-you must understand the implications of every
principle upon which your case depends.
Every advocate follows his own path, but I generally try to
do this in two ways. First, I think about questions. I attempt to
identify every question a judge could reasonably ask. 38 I think as
hard as I can about what the best possible answer is. And finally
I consider what further questions might follow from that answer,
and what the answers to those questions should be. This is, for
me at least, hard, hard work. It is generally easy to think of a
few difficult questions; it is impossible to think of them all. How
far down the list of conceivable questions you get, though, is a
pretty good indicator of how well prepared you are.
The other thing I often do is to try to explain the case to a
non-lawyer. This may seem peculiar, since judges, after all, are
lawyers. But I find that explaining the case to someone who is
not a lawyer helps me to discern whether there is a basic flaw in
my reasoning, and whether I am really able to distinguish what
is fundamental about my case from what is not. Preparing to
answer all sorts of doctrinally tricky questions is essential, but it
may also obscure the forest for the trees. You must be able to
see both very clearly when you stand up to argue.
Planting the Kernel

My third and final point relates to the argument itself.
Because oral argument is now so very different from what it was
37. Curtis, supra n. 5, at 217 (reprinting reminiscence of George Ticknor).
38. These questions necessarily will vary depending on the nature of the case. A good
catalogue of the sorts of questions to think about is provided by Judge Frank Coffin in his
useful book about appellate practice. See Frank M. Coffin, On Appeal: Courts, Lawyering,
and Judging 140-43 (W.W. Norton & Co. 1994).
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in Webster's day, it is difficult to translate the principles for
appellate advocacy that might have been used in his time into
precepts that will apply today. In all but the rarest of modern
appellate courtrooms, for example, we litigate in an environment
of interruption, not oration. But even in this very different
world, there is a fundamental principle from Webster's day that
still prevails, and it is this: When you stand up to present your
oral argument, facts and law at your command and head
crammed with answers to every conceivable question,
something else must be at the forefront of your mind. Daniel
Webster certainly had it in clearly in focus when he stood up to
argue. It is the kernel of the case-the one, two, or at the very
most, three points that you must impress upon the court before
you sit down.
These points mayor may not be those you emphasized in
your briefs. Sometimes, in fact, the thorough preparation you·
make for oral argument leads you to see the fundamentals of
your case in a different way. I once came to reconceptualize a
case on the very night before oral argument, because, although I
had conducted two moot courts in the case, each using a
different theme, neither had worked to my satisfaction. My lastminute change worked beautifully in that case, but I would
never counselbrinksmanship like this for its own sake, for it is
fraught with risk. But my own experience in this unusual case
does demonstrate, I think, that however difficult the kernel may
be to discern, and however late it reveals itself, you must have it
in mind when you appear before the court.
Once you have found the kernel, polish and refine it into its
purest, simplest form. And consider carefully how best to
present it to the court. Webster understood this precept well,
demanding of himself" the greatest effort of power in the tersest
and fewest words.,,39 In Webster's day the kernel was often
planted only after hours spent carefully tilling the judicial mind.
Nowadays, the best strategy before a fully prepared court may
be to make your point, pellucidly, as soon as you begin. But
however you plan to do it, you must be absolutely clear in your
mind about what the essentials are, and you must also be
confident that when you sit down, the judges will understand

39. Remini, supra n. 5, at 55.
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both what they are and why they are important. On this point,
another of Webster's admonitions comes to mind: "Depend
upon it," he said, "it is with our thoughts as with our personstheir intrinsic value is mostly undervalued, unless outwardly
expressed in an attractive garb." 40
Questions will come-in the Supreme Court they come in a
torrent. You should welcome and embrace questions, not be
annoyed by them. An oral argument punctuated by questions
may not be as transiently satisfying as a perfectly declaimed
speech. Almost certainly, it will not be studied with admiration
through the generations. But if those are your objectives, stick to
giving speeches or lectures. The oral advocate's job is to
convince judges, and questions provide the clearest window of
insight into what will accomplish that. Treat each question as a
sincere effort to understand your point--even if that might not
be the judge's true reason for asking. And answer every question
frankly, respectfully, and directly. If you are sufficiently wellprepared, you will often see how ajudge's question can lead you
to a point you need to make in order to help the court understand
the kernel of your case. Fish are more assertive today than they
were in Webster's time; they will not simply jump into your
pocket at the sight of your fishing rod. But once judges start to
nibble with questions, with direct and thoughtful answers you
can still hope to reel them in.
A CONCLUDING THOUGHT FROM ADMIRAL NELSON

Before I drown you in metaphor, I will close with one
further thought: In modem oral argument, the very best strategy,
whether answering questions or making your essential
affirmative point, may be to heed the advice with which the
great Admiral Nelson admonished his captains: "Never mind
maneuvers," he used to say, "always go at 'em.,,41 In his own
way, in his own time, that is just what Daniel Webster did.

40. Conversations with Lanman, in The Writings and Speeches of Daniel Webster, vol.
XIII (National ed., Boston 1903), quoted in Remini, supra n. 5, at 56.
41. Patrick O'Brian, Master alld Commander 115 (W.W. Norton & Co. 1970)
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